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French Canadian Participation
in the War of 1812
A Social Study of the
Voltigeurs Canadiens

Martin F. Auger
uring the War of 1812, the participation of
French Canadians in colonial militia units
such as the Voltigeurs Canadiens was of great
importance for the defence of Lower Canada. The
colony's lack of regular British troops combined
with the threats of American invasion rendered
crucial the mobilization of the local populace,
most of which was of French descent. Although
lacking the discipline and structure of British
regular soldiers. Lower-Canadian militiamen
were able to neutralize numerous American
invasion attempts. Altogether, this impressive
participation in the war effort helped redefine
the military character of French Canadians. It
also dissipated the British authorities' fears that
French Canadians were disloyal subjects. This
study analyses the military organization of the
Voltigeurs Canadiens to demonstrate the
importance of French Canadian participation in
the war, especially in Lower Canada, their
military campaigns and how the Voltigeurs'
victories became the pride of all French Canada.

D

In the early 19th Century, the defence of
British North America relied on regular soldiers,
provincial/ colonial (fencibles) soldiers,
militiamen and native Indians. The British
regular army was the backbone of this
apparatus. However, with the advent of the
French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) and the
Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815 ), Britain kept most
of its regular troops in Europe. As a result, the
British North American colonies were neglected
despite the American threat. By 1812, the

situation became problematic as there were only
9,000 British regulars garrisoned in the whole
of North America, of which 4,400 garrisoned
Lower Canada. This was a very moderate force,
considering that Lower Canada was the
economic and political centre of British North
America. 1
Because of the lack of regular soldiers,
provincial/ colonial regiments, commonly known
as fencibles, were raised for local defence among
the local population in each of Britain's North
American colonies as early as 1793. The
structure and organization of fencibles closely
resembled that of British regular regiments, and
they were subjected to the same laws, regulations
and conditions of service as regular units. With
fencible regiments, it was felt that each British
North American colony had some capacity to
defend itself, but there were never enough. For
example, in 1812, there were only 700 men in
the Canadian Fencibles, a regiment recruited
among the Lower-Canadian population. 2
Although the colonial authorities were well
aware of the shortage of regular troops in Lower
Canada, they knew they could not depend on
reinforcements while Britain was at war with
France. Their only alternative was to arm the
local population through the institution known
as the militia. 3 The fact was that every British
subject was a potential militiaman who could
be called upon to defend his country or colony
in times of crisis. 4 With an average population
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of 270,000 habitants in 1812, Lower Canada
was a perfect reservoir for the militia. 5 However,
the problem was that this colony was not like
any other. The vast majority of its population
(90 per cent) was of French origin. With Great
Britain at war with France, the British authorities
were fearful of their French Canadian subjects'
loyalty. Nobody knew how they would react in
the advent of war. 6
As war with the United States seemed more
and more imminent, the Lower-Canadian
Legislative Assembly, in consultation with
Governor-General Sir George Prevost,
authorized the mobilization of the militia in April
1812. 7 Overall, more than 60,000 militiamen
could be mobilized in Lower Canada 8 organized
in three categories; Sedentary Militia, Select
Embodied Militia, and Corps ofVolunteers. 9
The Sedentary Militia was the basis of this
system. As the 1803 Militia Act stipulated, every
able man aged between 16 and 50 was
automatically part of this body. Every April these
men registered for a week-end of military
training, which often ended in taverns. Each
Lower-Canadian parish was organized as a
company of the Sedentary Militia. The purpose
of this system was to make sure every colonial
subject was ready to defend his "homeland." In
most cases, these militiamen did Corvee work,
supplying front line troops with provisions and
equipment. Hence, when the war scare of 1812
emerged, these were the first units the Assembly
mobilized. 10
The Legislative Assembly also imposed
conscription in order to levy four battalions of
what came to be called the Lower Canada Select
Embodied Militia. In May 1812, 2,000bachelors
aged between 18 and 30 were drafted for a
minimum service period of 90 days and a
maximum of two years. Chosen by ballot among
the Sedentary Militia, the battalions of the Select
Embodied Militia acted as front line units and
were mobilized along the American border.U
Eventually, new battalions were created to
counter the American menace which existed in
the border regions. Every year, Sedentary Militia
divisions each had to conscript men within their
ranks for service in the Select Embodied Militia.
Overall, eight battalions were raised between
1812 and 1814. 12

Finally, the government created a volunteer
corps. Although similar in organization to
regular regiments, such outfits were made up of
volunteers who agreed to serve for the duration
of the war. Among such outfits was the Voltigeurs
Canadiens. Acting as front line units, these
corps were posted along the American border. 13
The structure of such regiments will be
addressed in the subsequent pages as we analyze
the organization of the Voltigeurs.
The defence of British North America also
depended on native Indian allies. In charge of
this force was the British Indian Department.
Its task was to ensure that good relations
prevailed between the Indian nations and the
British authorities in North America. On the
other hand, its military role was to secure the
Indians' alliance in the advent of war with the
United States. 14 This was done by supplying the
aboriginals with numerous gifts. Because natives
hoped for "homelands" to be returned to them
in America if the British were successful, they
supported the war in Canada. As a result, the
Department raised numerous Indian companies
to be used as military auxiliaries during the War
of 1812. In Lower Canada alone, 770 Indian
warriors were mobilized. 15
All military forces in British North America
were under the command of Governor-General
Sir George Prevost. Appointed on 13 September
1811, 16 Prevost never got complete jurisdiction
over military decision making. Although
commander-in-chief, he constantly received
orders from British Prime Minister Lord Robert
Liverpool; British Secretary of War Lord Henry
Bathurst; and Britain's Commander-in-Chief, the
Duke ofYork. 17 The Adjutant General of Lower
Canada's militia was Fran<;ois Vassal de Monviel,
who monitored all the militia units including the
Voltigeurs. 18

The Voltigeurs were created a few days after
the mobilization of the militia had been ordered
by the colony's Legislative Assembly. The idea
for raising such a military outfit was proposed
by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles-Michel
d'Irumberry de Salaberry to Governor-General
Prevost on 13 April1812. 19 The levy of this corps
was immediately authorized by the governor on
15 April. 20 Although most of the conditions in
de Salaberry's proposal were approved, Prevost
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made a few changes. For instance, de Salaberry
hoped to raise a "Corps of eclaireur or rifle."
His goal seemed to be a highly mobile outfit,
specialized in skirmishing and scouting
operations. As he indicated, "the use of Indians
would be necessary for the role and purpose of
this unit." Such a clause did not suggest the
establishment of a typical infantry regiment, for
Indian integration would not have been that
crucial. 21
Prevost
responded by approving
a "Volunteer Provincial
Corps of Light Infantry."
This meant a unit whose
organization
and
function was similar to
that of the fencibles or
other infantry regiments.
Since Indians need not
be integrated into such
regiments, Prevost only
attached 60 aboriginal
warriors
"armed,
clothed after their own
manner" to the unit.
This was probably less
than de Salaberry
originally expected.
Nonetheless, the new
corps was given the
name
Voltigeurs
Canadiens and began to
mobilize. 22
To command the
corps, Governor Prevost
appointed de Salaberry
whom
he
found
"adequately qualified to
command that force
because he has the
influence and necessary
energy to rise such a
corps." 23 However, the
main reason probably
was de Salaberry's great
reputation as a military
officer. Although a
French Canadian, de
Salaberry had served
since 1793 with the
British 60th Regiment of
Foot
("The
Royal
Americans") in Britain,

Canada, Holland and the West Indies. 24 His
career in the regular army ended when he was
promoted Lieutenant-Colonel of the Militia of the
Province of Lower Canada by Prevost on 1 April
1812. 25 Just 33 years of age, de Salaberry was a
perfect candidate to command the newly-created
Voltigeurs. His 19 years of military experience,
acquired on the battlefields of Europe and the
Antilles also made him aware of the most recent
tactic. 26
Although the Voltigeurs
Canadiens were to be
organized like a regular
regiment, they were not
part of the British
regular
army
establishment. Like
other militia corps of
volunteers, they had
been "raised to counter
the apprehension of war
with the United States or
actual war." This meant
that once the American
threat was eliminated,
the unit was to be
disbanded. 27 Further, the
unit was to "serve under
the Provincial Militia
Law of Lower Canada,
and to be guided by the
Rules and Regulations
therein laid down for the
good government of the
militia." Also, the bare
fact that Voltigeurs
officers were to be
"ranked junior to all
officers
of
their
respective ranks in the
line
of fencibles"
demonstrated that the
unit was not a regular
regiment. 28 Moreover,
the unit was given a
Private, Canadian Voltigeurs,
1813. Reconstitution by G.
Embleton. The men's uniform
was grey faced with black.
The headdress was a visored
light bearskin cap.
Chateauguay Battlefield
National Historic Site, Parks
Canada
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Recruiting for the Voltigeurs began on 16
April 1812. According to the Conditions for
Raising a Corps of Light Infantry (Canadian
Voltigeurs), issued by Governor-General Prevost

on 15 April1812, the unit was to consist of: 32
1 Major, Commandant
6 Captains
18 Lieutenants
1 Adjutant
1 Paymaster
1 Quartermaster
1 Surgeon
1 Sergeant Major
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
1 Paymaster Sergeant
1 Sergeant Armourer
1 Bugle Major
25 Sergeants
25 Corporals
10 Buglers
4 75 Privates

Lieutenant John Hebden, Adjutant of the Canadian Voltigeurs, c.18141815. The officers had a hussar-style dark green uniform trimmed with
black. Print after a portrait.

uniform distinct from that of regular regiments
and well in keeping with its light infantry
designation. Voltigeurs were given a uniform of
"grey with black collar and cuffs and black
buttons, with Canadian short boots and light
bear skin caps. "29 Officers wore a distinct
clothing green hussar-type uniform with black
boots and the bear skin cap unique to the unit.
The separate uniform worn by Voltigeurs
soldiers helped develop a regimental identity and
an esprit de corps. 30
In order to appreciate the value of French
Canadian participation in the War of 1812, it is
essential to understand the importance of
recruitment in the organizational structure of
the Voltigeurs. Although the recruiting of officers
was done somewhat differently from that of
ordinary soldiers, the purpose of recruitment
was still the same: persuade civilians to enlist
in the military. As a force of volunteers, the
Voltigeurs were very dependent on effective
recruiting, and this was not easy to accomplish. 31

Aside from the Sergeants, Corporals and Buglers
(Non-Commissioned Officers) and the Privates
(soldiers) on the above list, 34 officers were
needed. Historians Michelle Guitard and Luc
Lepine have found that 54 officers actually
served with the Voltigeurs during the War of
1812. 33 Officer recruitment for the unit was done
by both Charles de Salaberry and Fran<;ois
Vassal de Monviel. 34 Their recruiting methods
were quite common for the time. Individuals who
wished to become officers had "to contact some
well placed person who could recommend him
to Charles-Michel de Salaberry."35 Officers would
then be appointed on the understanding that
they would not receive their commission until
they had enlisted a specific quota of men. In that
sense, Voltigeurs officers acted as recruiting
agents among the Lower-Canadian population.
For instance, to obtain a captain's commission,
an officer had to recruit 36 militiamen. To
become a lieutenant, the candidate had to enroll
16 soldiers while an adjutant only had to recruit
11. 36 This system enabled only the serious
candidates to become officers in the unit.
However, this system did not please all
potential candidates. Recruiting men was a hard
task. Although bounties were offered, as we will
see, officers often had to attract civilians by
offering more money. As a result, officers often
had to draw from their own pockets to grant
such "bonuses." Further, officers had to feed and
lodge recruits until they arrived in camp.

26
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Therefore, many candidates refused officer
positions. 37 For example, when 14 Sedentary
Militia officers were approached for lieutenant
positions in the unit in 1812, only four accepted.
Altogether, 12 out of 21 candidates refused
commissions in the outfit. Hence, no enthusiasm
was demonstrated for commissions in the
Voltigeurs. This proved that establishing a good
and loyal officer cadre was not an easy task. 38
To become an officer in the Voltigeurs, one
had to be a Canadian-born subject or detached
from a regular unit. 39 Also, officers were to be
"selected from the most respectable family of the
province and to be nominated by the major
commandant, subject to the approval of the
Governor-General." 40 This was not an unusual
phenomenon. It was customary procedure to
recruit militia officers among the leading classes
of colonial society. Since such groups were
already in positions of social power, it was felt
to be only normal that they be given control of
officer positions in the militia. The aim was to
exploit the influence such individuals were
presumed to have in the social hierarchy and
extend it to the militia. The authorities felt
comfortable when the militia, especially the
Sedentary Militia, was led by officers who had
influences in their communities. Furthermore,
by granting officer positions to nobles,
merchants, bourgeois or professionals, the
colonial authorities felt they secured the loyalties
of the social elite. For many officers, militia
positions also became tools of social
promotion. 41

per cent), as opposed to Fernand Ouellet's notion
that the great majority of militia officers were
either nobles, merchants or professionals. 42
Although the social elite probably held stronger
positions in the militia, the core of the officers
was made up of ordinary citizens.
Although officers tended to come from
different social stratas, most of them lacked a
crucial characteristic in times of war: military
experience. When war came in 1812, military
outfits began to seek officers with military
background. 43 This proved a hard task since the
colony had not been at war since the American
Revolution (1774-1783). Hence, finding veterans
or individuals with military experience was
almost impossible. 44
Nonetheless, unlike most militia units. the
Voltigeurs recruited a good proportion of men

with military experience. Mter having retraced
the socio-professional background of the 54
Voltigeurs officers, Luc Lepine found that 15 of
them had military experience (28 per cent). Of
these officers, 9 were English, 5 were French
Canadians and 1 was Swiss. This truly proved
that the majority of anglo phone officers in that
corps had military experience. Since the
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However, the pressures of warfare changed
this dichotomy. As the War of 1812 progressed
and more militia officers were needed, the
colonial government began to draw officers from
other parts of life. Historian Luc Lepine showed
this transformation when he analyzed the socioprofessional background of the 2,695 militia
officers in Lower Canada during the War of 1812.
Lepine found that 1,337 ofthem were farmers,
462 remained unknown, 282 were merchants,
210 were rural non-farmers, 178 were
professionals, 153 were Seigneurs, 59 were in
the military, 10 were craftsmen, and 5 were
chaplains. His conclusion was that the majority
of militia officers were ordinary farmers (49.6
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Recruiting party of the Canadian Voltigeurs, c. 1812-1813.
Officers had to recruit their quotas of men in order to be
confirmed in their commissions. As in the days of New
France, much public business was done on the steps of a
town's church steps in Quebec. Here we see an officer
exhorting the virtues of military life in his company.
Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre.
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Voltigeurs were to act as a front line unit, the

authorities felt it necessary to grant officer
commissions to candidates with military
experience. In some cases, officers from British
regular regiments even asked for commissions
in the Voltigeurs. This probably had to do with
de Salaberry's reputation and the colonial
government's intention to have this regiment led
by a cadre of experienced officers. 45
When we examine the proportion of Englishspeaking officers in relation to the Frenchspeaking ones, the overrepresentation of the
English in the Voltigeurs is striking. Luc Lepine
found that although the anglophones constituted
less than 10 per cent of the Lower-Canadian
population, 22.5 per cent of them were officers
in the militia. In fact, of the 2,695 LowerCanadian officers, 607 were English. This
disproportion was even more evident in the
Voltigeurs. Of the 53 officers which served with
the corps during the war, 26 were anglophones
and 27 were francophones. Hence, 50 per cent
of the Voltigeurs officer corps was Englishspeaking.46 Therefore, we can clearly see that
the Voltigeurs officer corps was unique in Lower
Canada's militia since its proportion of
Anglophones and career officers was much
higher than in any other unit. In that sense, the
VoUigeurs resembled regular infantry regiments
much more than militia units.
To attract Lower Canadians to the rank and
file of the Voltigeurs, Governor Prevost relied
on certain incentives, especially to attract French
Canadians. 47 The recruiting campaign began in
April1812 when the colonial authorities started
to offer bounties of re4, later raised to re5, 48 to
attract volunteers in the Voltigeurs. Authorities
also offered Voltigeurs recruits other benefits
such as the same salary as regular troops, and
men enrolled in the corps were exempt from
Militia Ballot during their service. 49 Thus,
soldiers registered in the Voltigeurs were not to
be conscripted for the Select and Embodied
Militia, unlike the men of the Sedentary Militia. 50
As of May 1812, the Voltigeurs began to
publish public advertisements to seek out
recruits with the emphasis on bounties.
However, as the war progressed, the colonial
authorities adopted a new tactic. Using
newspapers, they attacked the honour and
sensibilities of French Canadians, describing

them as a passive, un-military and lazy people.
The aim was to prime French Canadians to
avenge such unrealistic statements. 51 When the
Quebec Mercury wrote that French Canadians
were a bunch of military degenerates, the LowerCanadian population responded just as the
government hoped it would. Historian Fernand
Ouellet well described the emotion behind such
accusations: "Ces accusations, portees
publiquement ou non, avaient vivement emu, si
ce n'est la masse, du mains l'elite. La guerre
apparait-elle a plusieurs comme une occasion
unique d'infliger un eclatant dementi a ces
jugements prematures. "52
The Catholic Church also played an
important role in recruiting men in the parishes.
Since militiamen were needed, the clergy acted
as some sort of recruiting agency. Priests, in their
sermons, incited their parishioners to enlist by
emphasizing the honor and pride in being a
French Canadian, greatfullness for the British
Crown's paternalism, and respect of religious
obligations, which ordered absolute obedience
to the King. 53 Priests further incited parishioners
by emphasizing that an American invasion of the
colony would mean the end of Catholicism in
Lower Canada. 54 As the war progressed, public
prayers for the men on the front lines also served
as a reminder that the war was still raging and
that men were needed for the defence. 5 5
However, despite such propaganda, the
recruitment of troops for the Voltigeurs was not
a rapid and easy process. Although de Salaberry
counted on the popularity of his officers to
accelerate recruitment, this did not materialize.
To fill their quotas, officers had to roam cities
and parishes seeking recruits who met the
minimum requirements: Canadian-born, aged
between 17 and 35 and no less than 5' 3"
(160 em) in height. 56 Plenty of men met the
standards, but getting them to enlist often took
a lot of time and effort. 57 Also, some officers
tended to be lazy in recruitment. For instance,
during the entire month of January 1813, only
10 men were recruited by a Voltigeurs officer in
Quebec City. De Salaberry even told his father;
"It is a great misfortune to have officers, who
care for nothing but their pleasures. ''58
As a result of these problems, the corps was
very slow to reach its authorized strength of
50059 so Prevost reduced this to 350 in early
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Canadian Voltigeurs training, c. 1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre.

June 1812. 60 Later that month, the strength of
the unit was limited to 300 men. The main
reason for such reductions in strength had to
do with the "exhausted state of the military
chest. "61 However, the stabilization of the
Voltigeurs' 300 men did not accelerate
recruitment. When the unit was inspected by
Governor Prevost in the summer of 1812, it was
still incomplete. Most of its officers were still
out recruiting when Prevost ordered the general
inspection. 62 By October 1812, the strength was
only of 270 men. This only proved that
recruitment problems were a terrible Achilles'
heel for the unit. 63 Reforms in recruitment
methods had to be introduced to attract men.
De Salaberry understood this when he indicated
in November 1812: "I am going to recruit as fast
as possible and the officers have entered in an
agreement to make up among ourselves the
recruiting money to m7 -8-9 per men, in order
to push on the recruiting." 64 Governor Prevost
later authorized de Salaberry to give an addition
of 10 shillings on the bounty of every men
recruited. Further, the Governor ordered that
each new recruit be given 50 acres ofland, to be
distributed after the war, in addition to the
individual's financial bounty. 65

This "bounty reform" was beneficial since
de Salaberry recruited about 100 new men in
late November alone. 66 Although many deserted,
this increase was a sign that recruits actually
sought bigger gratifications in order to join.
Nevertheless, the Voltigeurs continued to grow
in the subsequent months: from 320 men in
January 1813, 67 to 393 in February68 and 438
in March. 69 In only a few months, 168 new
recruits were enrolled, increasing its strength
by one third. 70 Hence, we can clearly see that
French Canadians tended to join when
gratifications were high enough. In a sense, they
acted as war profiteers rather than highly
motivated recruits who wished to prove their
loyalty to the British authorities.
The Voltigeurs, like most Lower Canada
militia units, were predominantly French
Canadian. However, many Anglophones served
in its ranks. As Michelle Guitard found in her
study, some 144 Anglophones saw active service
with the Voltigeurs during the war. 71 In addition,
the unit had to function in English because
British military commands and maneuvers were
given in English. This constituted a problem
since many of the Voltigeurs officers and men
29
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did not understand nor speak English.
Therefore, company orders had to be given in
both languages. However, speaking French
proved advantageous in battle. For example,
during the Battle of the Chateauguay (26 October
1813), de Salaberry and some ofhis officers gave
their orders in French to ensure that the enemy
would not comprehend them. 72
Overall, more than 700 men served in the
ranks of the Voltigeurs during the conflict. 73 It
is interesting that most came from the colony's
cities. According to historian Michelle Guitard,
Montreal and Quebec city furnished 59.8 per
cent of the total Voltigeurs corps. As she
demonstrated, 344 of the 700 Voltigeurs were
urbanites. This was impressive if we consider
that only 25 per cent of Lower Canada's
population was urban. 74 Perhaps this can explain
the good proportion of anglophones who served
with the unit during the war.
To further increase the strength of the
Voltigeurs, Governor Prevost began recruiting

men of the Select
Embodied Militia as of
March 1813. Conscripts
who were willing to
extend their military
service period were to be
free from restrictions if
they wished to volunteer
in the Voltigeurs. Also,
these new recruits were
to receive the usual ce5
bounty. Each Select and
Embodied
Militia
Battalion was expected
to furnish a maximum of
25
men
for
the
Voltigeurs. This was a
radical measure, for it
was illegal to do so
according to the Militia
Act. 75 Nevertheless, all of
these
measures
strengthed the unit,
which by late October
1813 numbered 576
men. 76
So confident became
de Salaberry of his unit's
strength that in 1814, he
30
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proposed to the colonial authorities to convert
the Voltigeurs into a "corps of regular troops."
In other words, he hoped to transfer the
Voltigeurs onto the British establishment as a
regular regiment of infantry. The new unit was
to consist of 480 men, who would all have
enlisted for a service period of seven years. In
the end, this project was refused by the
authorities.7 7 Historian Michelle Guitard believes
that this rejection was due to the changing
European situation. With France having been
defeated by Great Britain, British regular troops
could now be sent to North America. With this
in mind, converting the Voltigeurs into a regular
British unit was no longer a necessity. 78
The Voltigeurs had a great reputation for
discipline since De Salaberry was very strict and
the corps was trained much like a regular
regiment. 79 This may have been a doubled sword:
too harsh for many and not hard enough to keep
them in line. Mutinies, desertions,
insubordination, and many other breeches of
discipline were common to the Voltigeurs, as
they were to other militia
units. For example, on
16 June 1812, the
Voltigeurs camp in
Chambly fell victim to a
small mutiny when
soldiers refused to obey
orders. This small
insurrection was caused
by problems in the
distribution of bread
and pork, by rumors
that the officers hoped to
enroll the Voltigeurs as
regulars and by the
camp's lack of essential
equipment such as beds
for the barracks. 80 Upon
receiving news of the
mutiny,
Governor
Prevost reported his
"extreme concern at the
circumstance
of
insubordination in the
Canadian Voltigeurs." He
asked de Salaberry to
order a Regimental
Court Martial to judge
the offenders. As Prevost

The Provincial Corps of Light
Infantry (Canadian Voltigeurs);
painting by Robert J. Marrion.
CWM CN 75016
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A detachment of Canadian Voltigeurs in pursuit of deserters, c.1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre.

indicated: "The men are to be convicted and
sentenced to confinement and will be lodged in
jail at Montreal." 8 ' The Adjutant's Monthly Roll
of the Canadian Voltigeurs Regiment for the
month of June 1812 well demonstrated the
importance of the mutiny, for 21 individuals were
convicted by court martial. 82 The execution of
this sentence proved two things; that disciplinary
measures were to prevail and that the unit was
not immune to the harsh reality of military
insubordination. 83
Desertion was probably the Voltigeurs worst
problem during the War of 1812. Lepine found
that there were 299 cases of desertion during
the war: 87 in 1812; 99 in 1813; and 103 in
1814. Considering that 700 men served with the
unit during the war, this means that the desertion
rate of the Voltigeurs was 42.7 per cent although some may have deserted many times. 84
Many reasons can explain this high level of
desertion. Attracted by bounties, recruits were
often not ready for the hardships of military life
and many deserted upon receiving their
bounties. 85 For many, military discipline and the
"impersonal nature of military leadership" were
frightening experiences. This perhaps explains
why de Salaberry tried to learn the names of all

of his men. As historian Patrick Wohler
described; "His capacity for remembering names
stood him good stead and helped to reduce the
impersonal nature of military leadership which
was always frightening to militiamen." Although
this relaxed the stressful environment of military
life, it did not stop men from deserting. 86 Also,
the bare fact that Voltigeurs soldiers had to serve
for the duration of the war, unlike normal
militiamen, probably caused the greatest
discontent. If we consider the annual proportion
of deserters in Lepine's study, we can clearly see
this as the number of deserters tends to increase
as the war drags on.
Homesickness was certainly a major
incentive for desertion. Away from their families
and with no easy means of communication, men
often felt the desire to "visit" their relatives while
on duty. As Colonel Lacroix of the Select
Embodied Militia stated: "la plupart de ces
jeunes gens 'n'ont pas reellement deserte,' mais
sont partis 'voir leurs peres & meres comme des
jeunes gens qui n'ont pas encore sorti."' 87
Further, since most militiamen were farmers, the
long months of military service constituted a
problem since nobody was running the farm in
a society which depended on agriculture to
31
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survive. 88 Although militiamen often sent their
salaries to their wives, this was not enough to
suffice the needs of their families. Hence, wives
and children were in most cases without
resources. Some cures even talked about the
impoverishment of the families whose men were
in the militia. 89 This situation probably drove
many soldiers to desert and head back to their
families. However, such "leaves of absence" were
not accepted by the military authorities. As it
was said: "deserter a sa femme, c'est deserter a
l'ennemi."90
Military life was not easy and this probably
pushed many soldiers to desert. Troops were
often subjected to both the pressures of war and
the constraints of nature as they manned the
front lines. This was especially true of the
Voltigeurs. During operations, the unit was often
positioned in swamps or in dense forests, waiting
for the American invader. 91 Further, men were
often subjected to bad weather, especially as they
campaigned during the fall season. During
operations in Autumn 1813, for instance, de
Salaberry told that his troops had their "knees
in mud and water" and were "drenched through
with heavy rain. "92 Another example of exposure
occurred in January 1814 as de Salaberry and
a small force of Voltigeurs walked 65 kilometres
in deep snow to reach Salmon River, an area the
Americans were believed to attack. During this
long march, the unit lost 30 men to frostbite. 93
There are no doubts that such conditions

deteriorated the morale and health of
militiamen.
The campaign of 1813 was the wors"t in
terms of living conditions. This had to do with
logistical problems in supplying de Salaberry's
army which was stationed in the Chateauguay
valley south of Montreal. The problem
accentuated when Governor Prevost kept the
army mobilized well into December. This meant
that the force was subjected to winter
temperatures. As a result, the health of the
troops deteriorated as fevers and rheumatisms
began to spread. 94 De Salaberry himself fell
victim to rheumatism, experiencing "low fever
and bowels complaints. "95 As a result, morale
was at its lowest in 1813. Even de Salaberry's
morale began to drop as he felt his corps being
ill-treated by the Governor. De Salaberry even
stated; "Tant qu'a mon regiment il Prevost doit
bien savoir les desagrements etemels que j'esuis
avec eux, et qui si cela n'avait point ete pour rna
fermete, il y a longtemps qu'il n'aurait plus de
regiment Voltigeurs, ou pour mieux dire
d'esclaves de l'armee. "96 His morale was so low
that he told his father that he was thinking of
resigning from the military. 97 According to de
Salaberry, Prevost lost a lot of popularity among
the troops. 98
The desertion of Voltigeurs soldiers was
accentuated by the fact that their unit operated
on their own territory. Surrounded by a
sympathetic population, deserters could easily

Posting the night pickets, c. 1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre.
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find shelter in nearby homes or with local
families. The billeting of deserters among locals
became so common that de Monviel offered "une
recompense de quatre piastres allouees a toute
personne n'etant point en service actuel, qui
arretera un deserteur de la milice incorporee et
le conduira devant un juge." The aim of such a
measure was to stop this billeting of deserters. 99
Further, any person found lodging a deserter was
to be given a fine of 20 to 40 piastres. 100
Desertion may also have plagued the
Voltigeurs because, as a militia unit, it was not

subjected to the same "iron discipline" as regular
regiments. Militia punishments were less severe
than those of the regular army, and cases of
corporal punishment were rare. In fact, the
discipline of militia units fell under Provincial
Militia Laws instead of the British army's War
Act or Mutiny Act. Hence, the punishment of a
militiamen was not the same as a regular soldier.
For instance, a regular soldier would be
sentenced to 100 or 300 lashes for desertion
while a militiamen would only be condemned to
a few days in prison. 101 In fact, militia
punishments for mutiny or desertion were
similar. The offenders could be imprisoned for
periods of two years and be subjected to
extremely expensive fines. Also, they could be
sentenced to forced labour, such as chopping
wood, or working in the King's works. 102 In one
such case, a militiaman who was court-martialed
for starting a mutiny was sentenced to "payer
dans les rangs du Premier Battaillon, les mains
lies derriere le dos. Dela, il sera reconduit a la
maison de correction la plus proche pour y etre
detenu 9 mois et mploye a un travail dur apres
quoi il sera reconduit a son bataillon pour y
servir trois mois de plus que les autres
miliciens." 103 In other cases, mutineers were
"conducted, handcuffed, to their battalion to ask
pardon for their misbehavior on their knees, and
to be confined afterwards in a cell of the
Common Gaol of the district for three
months. " 104 Although some offenders were
pardoned for desertion, most were sentenced
to forced labour and solitary confinement. 105 One
such example occurred in 1813 when a
Voltigeurs deserter was sentenced to "four
months labour in the King's works at Quebec,
and to solitary confinement during the nights,
after which he will be reconducted to his
battalion, and will pass in the ranks, handcuffed, and a log tied to his feet. " 106 In another

case, a deserter was sentenced to eight days
solitary confinement, fed only with bread and
water. 107Although death was to be the ultimate
punishment, it was never imposed on a
militiamen. 108 These punishments proved how
slack militia discipline really was. In almost no
cases were offenders subject to corporal
punishments or death. Deserters had nothing
to lose in trying to escape. Therefore, this may
explain why desertion was so high in the
Voltigeurs during the war. Overall, there were
more than 1,620 cases of desertion in Lower
Canadian militia units during the war. 109 The
authorities knew full well that drastic measures
and corporal punishments would only bring
opposition from the entire Lower-Canadian
population. 110
Other disciplinary problems had to do with
the corps' disrespect of the local populace.
Although militia regulations approved the
quartering of troops in the houses or barns of
local inhabitants, the men were to behave and
were to respect the owners and their property.
As regulations specified, no man was to take any
"wood for fuel or provisions or in any way to
injure or destroy the property of the inhabitants."
Any soldiers who misbehaved were to be
punished and to "make due compensation to the
proprietor." 111 The problem was that such
regulations were not respected. In the
Chateauguay valley a lot of property was
damaged by militiamen. Further, there were
many cases of looting and foraging. Hence, the
situation turned into a disciplinary problem.
The lodging of troops during the war of 1812
was problematic, especially on the front lines of
the Chateauguay Valley, where the Voltigeurs
were stationed. Since no barracks existed, the
soldiers lived in small tents. However, since such
facilities did not protect them from damp or cold
weather, soldiers remained extremely dependent
on the climate. 112 Since they were authorized by
Militia Regulations to find shelter in the houses
or barns of local residents, many militiamen
exercised this right when weather was bad. 113
Eventually, the quartering of troops on local
properties led to some problems and
exaggerations. For instance, one Joseph Primeau
claimed that some 30 soldiers were quartered
in his house during the war. 114 Other owners
further claimed that their properties were used
by militiamen for periods longer than 10
33
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months. 115 In other cases, troops would use local
farms to house and feed their horses. This was
the case of an individual who claimed that
Voltigeurs officers' horses were housed in his
barns and stables. Further, the individual
indicated that he had to feed the animals with
his own corn, oat and hay. 116
The quartering of troops on local farms often
caused great damage. Houses and fumiture were
broken, while the presence of soldiers in the
fields often meant the destruction of crops.
Troops stole farm produce and equipment to
meet to their needs. In many cases, tools such
as axes, saws and hammers were taken. 117
Wooden fences and domestic firewood were
taken to be burned. 118 Soldiers even stole two
canoes at some point, which they used to
transport provisions on the rivers. 119 There were
many cases of unauthorized foraging, 120 as
Voltigeurs looted corn, wheat, barley, oats,
tobacco and vegetables , and stole chickens, pigs,
sheep and even oxes. 121 At one point, troops stole
a calf, two turkeys, 13 chickens, two potato
pouches and some logs from one single farmer. 122
Troops habitually took hay to feed their
horses. 123 All this proved that some disciplinary
problems existed in the Voltigeurs.
Many of the problems of discipline and
desertion in the Voltigeurs stemmed from the
fact that they had a long and busy war,
campaigning along the border with the US and
even into Upper Canada. The aim of Governor
Prevost was primarily to use the Voltigeurs,
numerous militia battalions and some Indians
as a defence force in the Chateauguay valley,
south of Montreal. In charge of this small army
of 1,200 men, de Salaberry told his father: "I
am something of a bit of general. I have carte
blanche from General de Rottenburg to act as
occasion may require, without waiting for his
orders. "124 This small army, 90 per cent French
Canadians, defended the main corridor of
invasion into Lower Canada 125 with no cavalry
or artillery units in support. 126
As a defensive force, de Salaberry and his
men had to adopt defensive strategies and
tactics. 127 Anticipating American invasions, as
enemy units constantly assembled across the
border, de Salaberry began to prepare his
positions in the autumn of 1812. Knowing full
well that his force was too small to fight a large
American army, de Salaberry began resorting to

guerilla tactics. As a result, he kept his force
constantly in movement along the front lines to
keep American intelligence from knowing how
small his force really was. 128 As historian
Benjamin Suite described: "C'est un camp volant
qui s'eparpillait, se rasseblait, prenait mille
formes, etait partout, ne paraissait nulle part
en une seule masse et faisait croire aux
americains que c'etait l'avant-garde d'une armee
solide." 129
Guerilla methods also meant frustrating the
enemy. In that sense, scorched-earth policies
were adopted. For instance, orders were given
to destroy all bridges "for a distance of a league
and a half in advance" of the army's positions. 130
As Louis de Salaberry, father of Charles de
Salaberry and commander of the 1st Battalion
of the Select and Embodied Militia 131 told his
wife in September 1812: "L'ordre est donne, et
l'on commence demain a l'executer, pour rompre
taus les pants d'ici aux lignes, gater, briser les
chemins, les obstruer par des abbatis
d'arbres .... Cela peut toujours retarder leur
Americains marche. " 132 However, such
operations also had their downsides, as Louis
de Salaberry told his wife in another letter: "On
acheve aujourd'hui de detruire les chemins,
pants, chaussees. L'on a brule un tres beau pont
et tout neuf. - C'est reellement grand damage
qu'une telle destruction. Tout cela un ouvrage
immense a reparer et coutera infiniment quand
la paix reviendra. Mais la necessite, dit-on, ne
connait plus de loi. Les habitants sont stupHaits
de tout les ravages. "133 In some cases, scorchedearth policies meant the burning and destruction
of crops, as it occurred in the Chateauguay valley
during the autumn of 1813. 134
The Voltigeurs became reknown as great
skirmishers and bush fighters. They understood
guerilla warfare and used it to the best of their
advantage. Historian Ronald L. Way well
described this when he talked about how
Voltigeurs elements operated during the battle
at Chrysler's Farm in Upper Canada on 11
November 1813, " ... they had skillfully utilized
the cover of rocks, stumps, and fences and in
their drab uniforms were almost invisible. "135
Andrew Cochran, a Lower-Canadian bureaucrat,
even wrote that French Canadians were superb
guerilla fighters.
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Canadian Voltigeurs getting ready for the morning inspection, c.1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre.

The fact is that the Canadians were competent
to defend their own soil and they have the
courage to do it. Few creatures can bear more
hardships with less refraining than a Canadian
- none can render a more ready obedience to
what is required of them - none will be more
persevering in what he undertake - and none
are better calculated for the partisan warfare &
bushfighting by which the progress of an enemy
through that part of the country is to be checked
than a Canadian farmer. 136

During the war of 1812, the Voltigeurs fought
numerous engagements, some in Upper Canada
and even the United States. In the end, the unit
fought at the battles of Salmon River (23
November 1812), Sackett's Harbour (29 May
1813), Chateauguay (26 October 1813),
Chrysler's Farm (11 November 1813),
Missisquoi Bay (26 March 1814), LaColle (30
March 1814), Cape Vincent (14 May 1814), Lake
Champlain (26 June 1814), Oddelltown (28
June 1814), and Plattsburg (6-11 September
1814 ). 137 Some Voltigeurs even served on the
gunboats which patrolled the St. Lawrence and
the Great Lakes to compensate for the lack of
sailors. 138 Nevertheless, of all these battles,
ChiHeauguay remained the most important and
a major victory for French Canadians.
In the Battle of the Chateauguay of 26
October 1813, de Salaberry's little army

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001

neutralized an American invading army almost
seven times its size. 139 At the time, de Salaberry's
force numbered approximately 1, 700 men while
the American army, under the command of
General Wade Hampton,
numbered
approximately 5,500 men. Although both armies
were considerable, only 2,000 Americans and
300 Canadians actually fought, the rest were
placed in reserve. 140 Outnumbered, de
Salaberry's small force inflicted a crushing defeat
on the American army using guerilla methods
and skirmishing tactics. Overall, the Canadian
force lost only five men while the Americans lost
at least 50. 141
The battle of Chateauguay became a symbol
of French Canadian pride and a tool of
nationalism. As the Gazette de Quebec observed
in November 1813:
L'Affaire pres de Ia ligne sur Ia riviere
Chateauguay est Ia premiere ou il y ait eu un
nombre considerable d'habitants du pays
d'engages avec les Americains depuis le
commencement de Ia guerre. Dans cette affaire
notre force entiere, avec tres peu d'exceptions,
depuis le commandant jusqu'au dernier etait des
canadiens ... Ceci, aussi bien que d'avoir repousse
l'ennemi, est une preuve evidente que nous avons
de bans officiers et de bans soldats ..

The Lower Canadian Legislative Assembly also
recognized the importance of this victory when
35
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Canadian Voltigeurs skirmishing in the woods, c. 1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre.

it stated on 25 January 1814: "La Chambre
reconnait sensiblement la valeur distinguee et
la discipline qu'ont montrees les officiers noncommisioned,- soldats et miliciens de la petite
bande sous le commandement immediat du
Lieutenant Colonel de Salaberry lors de I' action
de Chateauguay." 142 In one such letter to the King,
the Assembly wrote:
Nous, les fideles sujets de Sa Majeste, les
Communes du Bas Canada, ... supplions tres
humblement qu'il plaise a votre altesse Royale
de prendre en sa tres-gracieuse consideration
les services que le Lieutenant Colonel Charles
de Salaberry a rendus a son pays, tant par son
habilete que par son courage, dans l'affaire
glorieuse ... sur la riviere Chateauguay .... C'est
pourquoi les fideles Communes de Sa Majeste
supplient tres humblement votre altesse Royale
de vouloir bien prendre en consideration ces
services distingues, et pour inciter a l'avenir
!'emulation de nos compatriotes pour la defence
de cette province contre les ennemis de Sa
Majeste .... Nous saisissons cette occasion pour
renouveller a Votre Excellence !'expression de
nos sentiments de gratitude pour a voir, par votre
prudence, par la sagesse de vos mesures, et par
votre habilete, conserve ces provinces
importantes a l'Empire, et pour la sollicitude
paternelle avec laquelle Votre Excellence a veille
au bonheur des sujets de sa majeste, et pour
prier Votre Excellence d'etre assuree que ces

bienfaits resteront pour toujours profondement
graves dans le coeur canadiens.' 43

This French Canadian pride in the victory
of Chateauguay was further propagated in
French Canadian nationalist historiography. In
this "myth ofChateauguay," de Salaberrywas a
hero and the Voltigeurs symbols of French
Canadian participation in the war. The whole
affair became a source of intense nationalism.
For example, in his Histoire de la Milice
Canadienne Fran{:aise (1897), Benjamin Suite
wrote: "Parmi les actions remarquables de cette
guerre, nous choisissons de preference celles ou
les Canadiens Franyais ant brille Chateauguay,
pour faire comprendre au lecteur que notre
element a accompli son devoir en conscience,
durant ce conflit ou l'on craignait de nous voir
engager, par suite de fausses impressions
rependues sur notre compte, grace a une
certaine ecole de politiciens. "144 Even the clergy
used the Battle of Chateauguay as a nationalist
tool. In his Histoire du Canada, C.S. Viator
wrote in 1915 that the battle "prouva surtout la
loyaute et le patriotisme des Canadiens
Franyais. "145 However, no historian or writer can
compare with historian Thomas Chapais, who
wrote in his Cours d'histoire du Canada, II:
"Chateauguay ... Ce fut essentiellement une
victoire canadienne-franyaise. Elle est bien a
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nous et personne ne peut nous la ravir ...
Chateauguay, c'etait notre vengeance.
Chateauguay, c'etait notre indeniable loyalisme
et de notre patriotisme ardent. "146
While it lifted French Canadian spirits, the
Battle of the Chateauguay also proved to British
authorities that French Canadians were not
"silent enemies" of Britain, nor were they
potential traitors. It had proved that
francophones were willing to defend their
"homeland" just as much as the anglophones.
Governor Prevost was to first to recognize the
importance of French Canadian participation in
the War of 1812. The General Orders of the
Militia of 27 October 1813 well demonstrated
Prevost's gratitude towards French Canadians:
Son Excellence, le Gouverneur en chef et
commandant des forces ... se fait un devoir et un
plaisir de payer le tribut d'eloge qui est si
justement du au ... Lt. Colonel De Salaberry pour
sa conduite judicieuse et digne d'un officier ...
Son Excellence doit encore les plus grands eloges
a toutes les troupes de cette station, pour leur
confiance, leur discipline. et leur patience a
endurer les fatigues et les privations qu'elles ont
eprouvees. Leur determination a perseverer
dans cette conduite honorable ne peut manquer
d'assurer la victoire aux braves et loyaux
Canadiens, et de jetter le trouble et la confusion
dans le coeur de l'ennemi, s'il pensait souiller
de sa presence cet heureux pays. 147

Governor Prevost also noted on November 4,
1813:
His Excellency the Governor in chief and
Commander of the forces, has the highest pride
and satisfaction in declaring His
acknowledgemnt to the loyal and brave Militia
of Lower Canada, for the zeal and alacrity with
which they flew to their posts, and for the
patience and firmness with which they have
endured, in this inclement season, the severe
hardships and privations to which they have
been exposed; the steadiness and discipline of
the whole have been conspicuous; and the
undaunted gallantry displayed by six companies,
almost to a man, composed of Canadian
Fencibles and Militia, under the immediate
command ofLieut.-Col. de Salaberry, in repelling
with disgrace, an American invading army,
twenty times their numbers, reflects unfading
honor on the Canadian name. 148

King George III acknowledged French
Canadian participation in the war effort and the
Battle of Chateauguay. His comments were

presented in the General Orders of the Militia
on 26 March 1814:
Son Altesse Royale a observe avec la plus grande
satisfaction l'habilete et la bravoure qui ont paru
dans les officiers et les hommes qui composaient
le detachement de troupes opposees a l'Armee
du General Hampton. La resistance qu'elles ont
opposee avec succes a un ennemi aussi
disproportionne a abattu la confiance de
l'ennemi, deconcerte ses plans, eta mis en surete
cette partie des frontieres canadiennes. Son
Altesse Royale voit avec un plaisir particulier que
les sujets canadiens de Sa Majeste ont eu enfin
!'occasion (que son Altesse Royale desirait
depuis longtemps leur etre procuree) de refuter
par leurs propres glorieux efforts pour la defence
de leurs pays, les accusation calomnieuses de
desaffection et de deloyaute que l'ennemi avait
avancees avant sa premiere invasion de Ia
province ... Vous ne manquerez pas d'exprimer
au Lieut. Colonel De Salaberry en particulier, et
a tous les officiers et hommes sous son
commandement, en general, la tres-gracieuse
approbation de son Altesse Royale de leurs
services meritoires et distingues. Son Altesse
Royale vous envoye, par la premiere occasion
sure, les Drapeaux que vous avez sollicites pour
les Bataillons de Milice Incorporee, sentant qu'ils
ont montre une habilete et une disposition a les
defendre d'insulte, qui leur donnent le meilleur
titre a une pareille marque de distinction 149

It is ironic to note that the authorities believed

that the French Canadian participation in the
War of 1812 was a perfect example of their
"loyalty" to the British Crown. "Loyalty" was
perhaps a strong word. As Jean-Pierre Wallot
indicated: "Ce qui motive d'abord les Canadiens
en 1812, c'est la 'fidelite a eux-memes', 'la
resolutions toujours la meme de rester dans leur
pays et d'avoir une vie a eux."'~ ° French
Canadians were more inclined to fight for their
own interests than those of the British crown,
and in this they resembled most other colonial
militias in 18th century North America. As
author Rene Chartrand described when quoting
a British officer: "perhaps they did not love the
English Government or people, but they loved
the Americans less. "151
5

Fernand Ouellet agrees, "Laguerre cree un
danger exterieur auquel toutes les classes de la
societe sont eminemment sensibles. L'Americain,
ce n'est pas seulement l'envahisseur, c'est le
porteur de valeurs que le milieu canadienfranc;ais rejette." 152 Ouellet further specified that
French Canadians fought because they feared
37
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that American commercial and industrial
capitalism, combined with the ideologies of
Republicanism and Democracy, might
destabilize, if not destroy, the economic and
social infrastructure of French Canada. 153
Feeling threatened by the American invader, the
security of Great Britain was perceived as the
only means to defend their interests. For many
French Canadians, "la puissance maritime et
militaire de l'Angleterrre procure a la fois
securite et reconfort aux coloniaux. " 154
Nevertheless, the War of 1812 led the British
authorities to be somewhat more tolerant, for a
time, of their French Canadian subjects.
The War of 1812 came to an end on
Christmas eve 1814 with the signing of the Treaty
of Ghent. As a result, both Great Britain and
the United states accepted the status quo ante
bellum. 155 With the hostilities over, the Voltigeurs
were disbanded on 15 March 1815. 156 With the
disbandment of the unit came the end of a proud
regiment. but one which had created a rich and
enduring legacy for French Canada.
The Voltigeurs proved to be good fighters,
and their victory at Chateauguay was a fine
example of their efficiency in combat. For French
Canadians, Chateauguay also became a symbol
of pride, and it convinced British authorities that
French Canadians were not "disloyal" subjects.
Therefore, despite all the problems encountered
by the Voltigeurs during their existence, they
made an important contribution to colonial
defence, and a lasting impression on French
Canadian self-esteem.
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